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Preface for Symposium on Globalization and the Brain Drain in the Journal of
Development Economics, 20103 This argument applied equally to the inﬂux of workers from population-and-
poverty-intensive Bangladesh, Pakistan and India into the Middle East with sparseThe papers in this special issue were all presented at a conference
on "Globalization and the Brain Drain: Theory, Evidence and Policy",
organized at Bar-Ilan University and the Hebrew University on
December 9–11, 2008, in Ramat Gan and Jerusalem, Israel, with the
support of the Adar Foundation, the Schnitzer Foundation for
Research on the Israeli Economy and Society, and the Ben-Porath
Fund, Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel. Eric
Gould and Hillel Rapoport served as organizers.
The symposium on “Globalization and the Brain Drain” in this
journal, edited by Gordon Hanson and Hillel Rapoport, follows by
35 years a symposium that I edited on practically the same subject in
this very journal in 1975 (Vol. 2. No. 3).
The earlier symposium contained analytical and econometric
studies which were partly, though by no means entirely, motivated
by the proposal I had advanced at the time to “tax the brain drain.”1
This proposal, now known as the Bhagwati Tax (rather like the Tobin
Tax on capital ﬂows), was prompted by the analysis of skilled
migration in the framework of the “diaspora” that was evolving.
The subject matter of the “brain drain,” while it has witnessed
renewed interest in the analysis of the Bhagwati Tax as evidenced by
the latest analyses by JohnWilson in this symposium and elsewhere,2
has also developed in many new directions, prompted by the vastly
greater globalization on the dimension of ﬂows of humanity across
borders. The increased globalization has meant that many more
professional migrants now work other than in their own countries of
origin. Besides, many more now go back and forth so that issues such
as return and to-and-fro migration must now be analyzed, rather than
once-and-forever shift of migrants in the models we generally used in
the 1960s and 1970s. Globalization has also meant that the
ramiﬁcations of the diaspora “model” have now become important.
Thus, for instance, we now must ask more pointedly what institu-
tional support structures would maximize the contribution that the
skilled migrants settled elsewhere can make to their countries of
origin and (often) continuing nationality.
It is nonetheless instructive to begin by recalling how migration
was treated in policy analyses in the early postwar years and what we
learnt from them that endures as critical elements of modern analysis
of the phenomenon.1 See, in particular, the econometric studies in chapters 3 and 4 by George
Psacharopoulos and Robert E.B. Lucas respectively in volume II of Brain Drain and
Taxation, Bhagwati (1976).
2 See in particular his contribution, and that of John McHale, in Bhagwati and
Hanson (2009). Also, there is an earlier volume of essays by MIT Press on the subject,
edited by Bhagwati and Wilson (1989).
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inform them, distinguished between both unskilled and skilled
(professional) migration ﬂows. They also distinguished between3
the welfare implications for the “sending” (or “home”) countries and
the “receiving” (or “host”) countries. While there were indeed ﬂows
of the unskilled from poor to poor countries, as when migrants from
Malawi and Botswana went to South Africa to work in the mines, the
typical analysis centered on unskilled migrants from the poor to the
rich countries, as with the guestworkers (the gastarbeiters) whowent
from Turkey and Yugoslavia to European countries, such as West
Germany. Similarly, while the phrase “brain drain” had originated in
the context of the European outﬂow of scientists to the United States,
it quickly shifted to the phenomenon of outmigration from poor
countries like India to rich countries like the United States.
For unskilled migration, which was legally managed, the pre-
sumption was that it was a win–win phenomenon for both the
sending and the receiving countries. A Turkish guestworker would
ﬁnd employment at improved income in Germany, simultaneously
relieving Turkey's unemployment and underemployment, while
providing the labour that permitted a German growth revival that
would otherwise be handicapped by the massively depleted labour
supply as a result of the Second World War.
But when it came to skilled migration, the phenomenon was
viewed very differently, as a “lose” proposition by the poor sending
countries which saw it as a “brain drain” that would handicap their
development, whereas the receiving rich countries saw it as a “win”
proposition whereby they augmented their skilled labour supply.4
Scientiﬁc analysis of skilled migration at the time, beginning with
the writings of Harry Johnson (1965, 1967) and Johnson (1967),
Grubel and Scott (1966) and resulting in a substantial literature
reviewed in the earlier JDE Symposium by Bhagwati and Rodriguez
(1976), made some important analytical points that are worth
recalling.populations and oil-bonanza induced growth requiring an inﬂux of unskilled (and
even skilled) labour supply. The economist Michael Piore (1979) has argued, in his
celebrated book, Birds of Passage, that the United States did not need this labour inﬂux
until much later because the growth of manufacturing production in the North was
supported by the inﬂux of black labour from the South.
4 The concern over “brain drain,” as it happens, arose ﬁrst between the rich
countries: European countries were worried about the loss of their professional
manpower to the United States. Quickly, however, the issue was transposed to the
outﬂow of professionals from the poor to the rich countries, where it has since then
been located.
5 This is about to change, in turn, as many European countries with rapidly reduced
birth rates and even China as a result of the success of the one-child policy, face
shortages of unskilled labour, much as postwar Europe did. Maybe we will see the
return of guestworker programs on a massive scale, not just to siphon off the illegal
inﬂux but also quite simply to supply the unskilled labour for a growing economy as
the demographics lead to reduced labour supply.
6 I have argued against this proposal in several writings. See in particular Bhagwati
(2000) and my response in a Letter to the Editor, Bhagwati (2010), to an “Economics
Focus “article in The Economist on Becker's long-standing proposal which the ill-
informed writer wrongly assumed was a new proposal.
2 EditorialFirst, it became clear that there was no analytical symmetry
between capital ﬂows and migration. When a nation exports capital,
the group over which one deﬁnes welfare is unchanged. But when
outmigration occurs, the group over which welfare is deﬁned can
change. Thus, the welfare function for a c country will depend on the
sociological and political nature of the migration. Therefore, it is
necessary to disaggregate the welfare impacts on those left behind in
the home country, the migrants themselves, and the host country
nationals who receive the immigrants. “National welfare”will depend
on which country the migrants are counted in. Thus, an Indian
migrant doctor in the United States may be counted as part of Indian
welfare or American welfare or neither or both.
Second, once we disaggregate the phenomenon, then it also
follows that the three groups do not experiencewelfare impacts in the
same direction. Since we are discussing migration within the
framework of immigration restrictions which segment the receiving
and the sending countries — illegal migration dilutes this segmenta-
tion but does not eliminate it— evidently we can assert that migration
will increase overall (world) welfare. Then again, for voluntary
migration, we can presume that the migrants improve their welfare.
But those left behind may lose (as the losers probably have little voice
in policymaking) and host country nationals will gain (the presump-
tions being that else the immigration would not be allowed, with
illegal migration of the skilled being rare).
Third, the presumption that many had of the effect on those left
behindwas indeed a pessimistic onewhen the early analytical literature
began in the 1970s. Many in the poor countries, with small stocks and
new additions of skilled professionals, worked with the view that if one
professionalwent away, the productivity of the restwould collapse: one
Bhagwati going away to MIT would mean that the rest of the small
economists' group at Delhi School of Economics would get a big hit and
also that it may mean that all others would out-migrate also to Yale,
Princeton and Columbia, decimating the Delhi School. This “essential
factor” view is a great exaggeration, of course.
Then again, many thought that there are substantial externalities if
certain professionals, such as doctors, depart. The sheer availability of
doctors brings utility from potential patients in excess of what the
doctor earns from his patients. But then, one may counter that this
argument applies to rural areas where doctors are scarce, whereas the
doctors actually are cheek by jowl in the cities. But then, the worry
about migration of doctors in the static context of a given supply can
be partly restored along the lines of Bhagwati and Hamada (1976)
who argued that as doctors get too abundant in the cities, their
earnings drop, prompting them to actually move into towns and the
into villages (if only on a 1 day a week basis).
Fourth, the early literature than asked: if those left behind lose,
could not the gains of the migrants from being allowed to enter the
rich country economies, with higher incomes than they earned in
their home c countries, be taxed to compensate the losers? This is one
notion that led to the idea of taxing the brain drain.
An added argument for such taxation was that the gains to the
migrants represented “rents” and therefore they were a perfect target
for raising resources for development in the home countries regardless
of whether those left behind had lost from the emigration or not.
One may well ask, as I did, whether the phenomenon of
outmigration of professionals could be exploited by the home country,
even when those left behind gained, to add to those gains. This led
immediately to the notion of the diaspora and use of it to maximize
the payoffs to a country from its outﬂow of skilled professionals. In
this context, the tax on the brain drain represented a way in which
those left behind could share in the gains accruing to the emigrants
from their leaving to work in the rich countries.
All these arguments were compatible with the view that the rich
receiving countries would gain from the inﬂux of skilled manpower:
the tax would takemoneys from the rents earned by the migrants, not
from the host country nationals whose welfare gains would not bedirectly affected by the tax. In fact, the legal immigration systems in
many rich countries have been shifted, in different ways, to admit
more skilled. At the same time, the legal immigration of the unskilled
has come to be viewed in the rich countries as undesirable, with the
unskilled immigration now mostly diverted to illegal channels.5 In
fact, several economists such as Julian Simon and Gary Becker have
been arguing for a substantial shift of legal immigration to skilled
professionals, even suggesting that legal quotas be auctioned off to the
highest bidders.6
This symposium takes major strides towards an updated, and
indeed insightful, analysis of the ongoing “Brain Drain” phenomenon,
using both theoretical and quantitative analyses. The phenomena of
return migration and the diaspora, as also more conventional issues
such as taxation of the brain drain and the determinants of skilled
outmigration, are illuminated with great success.
John Wilson carries the analysis of the Bhagwati Tax probes yet
further by analyzing the objection that the revenues may be spent by
governments that waste them. Jeffrey Grogger and Gordon Hanson
skillfully integrate the two phenomena that the more highly educated
are more likely to emigrate and that they are also more likely to settle
in the receiving countries. Bruce Weinberg produces a fascinating
analysis that shows that democracy produces more accomplished
skilled professionals but also leads to higher rates of out-migration: a
contribution that has an important lesson also for the growing
literature on democracies. Complementary analysis of the role of
intellectual property rights in skill creation and competition for
“brains” is the contribution of Peter Kuhn and Carol Ausland. Return
migration is the subject of an interesting empirical investigation by
John Gibson and David McKenzie and, among other issues, also of the
analysis by Christian Dustmann, Yoram Weiss and Itzhak Fadlon. The
effects of the diaspora are studied byMichael Beine, Frederic Docquier
and Caglar Ozden who examine the effect of diasporas on migration
ﬂows. Hillel Raporport and AndrewMountford build a dynamicmodel
that analyzes the impact of skilled migration on the distribution of
world income, with suggestive results; the paper should be read
alongside the contribution by David Stadelman and Volker Grossman
who use instead an overlapping-generations model to suggest that
skilled outmigration could increase inequality between the sending
and receiving countries.
So we witness in this symposium a remarkable deepening of our
understanding of the phenomenon of skilled migration, and of the
implications that follow for several areas of public policy.
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